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Abstract: 
The study of self-focused attention explores both state self-focus (objective self-awareness) and individual-
differences in trait self-focus (self-consciousness). Trapnell and Campbell (1999) proposed a motivational 
model of individual-differences in self-focused attention, based on rumination and reflection as types of self-
focus. Two studies, with Internet-based (Study 1, n = 101) and college student samples (Study 2, n = 115), 
assessed the construct validity of rumination and reflection. Self-focus was measured by recognition latencies 
for self-relevant words (Study 1) and the completion of ambiguous sentences with first-person pronouns (Study 
2). Neither rumination nor reflection predicted self-focused attention in either study. Rumination and reflection 
seem to be types of self-relevant motivation, not types of self-focused attention. 
Keywords: Rumination; Reflection; Self-awareness; Self-focus; Self-evaluation; Attention; Personality 
assessment; Construct validity 
 
Article: 
1. Introduction 
The study of self-focused attention has two research traditions. The first tradition, the study of self-awareness, 
explores the consequences of momentary awareness of the self (Carver, 2003; Duval & Silvia, 2001; Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972). This research manipulates self-focused attention with conditions that make the self salient, 
such as mirrors, video cameras, and reminders of novel aspects of the self. The second tradition, the study of 
self-consciousness, explores individual-differences in self-focused attention (Buss, 1980). The traditional view 
of self-consciousness proposes public and private dimensions, commonly measured by the self-consciousness 
scales (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). 
 
The character of self-awareness research has not changed much. Although objective self-awareness theory has 
expanded, recent research on self-awareness addresses the same concerns that motivated the original theory (see 
Silvia & Duval, 2001a)—the relationship between self-awareness and consistency motivation (Silvia & Duval, 
2004; Wicklund & Duval, 1971), how people respond to discrepancies between self and standards (Duval & 
Lalwani, 1999; Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris, 1973), and how causal attributions affect self-regulation (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1973; Duval & Silvia, 2002; Silvia & Duval, 2001b). Recent individual-differences research, 
however, has changed since the early days of public–private self-consciousness research. Public self-
consciousness seems to have faded in popularity, perhaps due to critical reviews of its construct validity 
(Gibbons, 1990; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987). Private self-consciousness remains popular, although its 
psychometric properties have been criticized. Many studies find that the private self-consciousness scale forms 
two subscales: internal-state awareness and self-reflection (e.g., Cramer, 2000; Creed & Funder, 1998; Nystedt 
& Ljungberg, 2002; Ruipérez & Belloch, 2003). The meaning of this finding is controversial, because the items 
forming the subscales and the correlations between the subscales vary (Bernstein, Teng, & Garbin, 1986; Britt, 
1992; Duval & Silvia, 2001; Silvia, 1999). 
 
In response to limitations in the public–private approach, a second generation of individual-differences research 
has emerged. Several new models have appeared in recent years (Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002; McKenzie 
& Hoyle, 1999; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Of these, Trapnell and Campbell’s (1999) model of rumination 
and reflection has received the most attention (Carver, 2003; Joireman, Parrott, & Hammersla, 2002; Teasdale 
& Green, 2004). Rumination and reflection have been shown to predict other variables, but the critical tests of 
construct validity—relations with measures of self-directed attention—have not yet been conducted. In this 
article, we review the rumination–reflection model and present two studies that directly assessed whether 
rumination and reflection involve self-focused attention. 
 
2. Rumination and reflection 
Trapnell and Campbell’s (1999) rumination–reflection model was motivated by what they called ―the self-
absorption paradox.‖ Private self-consciousness correlates with many factors. Some factors seem adaptive and 
beneficial, such as greater articulation of the self-schema and a greater desire for self-understanding (e.g., 
Nasby, 1985). Other factors, however, seem maladaptive, such as psychopathology (Ingram, 1990). Several 
authors have viewed this mix of positive and negative relations as paradoxical (e.g., Creed & Funder, 1998). 
Trapnell and Campbell attributed these effects to motivational confounds in the private self-consciousness scale 
(Fenigstein et al., 1975). They suggested that people focus attention on the self for different reasons, and that 
these reasons must be separated in the assessment of dispositional self-focus. 
 
The motivational interpretation of self-focused attention proposes two types of dispositional self-focus. One 
type, rumination, is ―self-attentiveness motivated by perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self‖; the 
second type, reflection, is ―self-attentiveness motivated by curiosity or epistemic interest in the self‖ (Trapnell 
& Campbell, 1999, p. 297). In this model, individual-differences in self-focused attention are represented as a 
conjunction of motivation and attention. Both rumination and reflection involve heightened attention to self, but 
they differ in the motive behind the attention. Rumination involves self-focus motivated by perceived threats; 
reflection involves self-focus motivated by interest in the self. Rumination and reflection are rooted in earlier 
research on self-reflection and internal-state awareness, the private self-consciousness subscales. That research 
suggested two types of self-consciousness, but it did not develop the motivational view proposed by Trapnell 
and Campbell. 
 
Research thus far has shown interesting relationships between rumination, reflection, and other variables, such 
as Big Five factors, empathy, affect, perceptions of self-other similarity, and autobiographical memories 
(Joireman et al., 2002; Teasdale & Green, 2004; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Research to date, however, has 
not addressed the construct validity of rumination and reflection in regards to self-focused attention. 
Rumination and reflection, as types of self-focused attention, should correlate with measures of self-focus. 
Many traditions in personality psychology assert that self-report measures of traits must predict behavior, either 
because traits are real ―in the skin‖ entities (Allport, 1961; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985) or because traits are 
defined by behaviors (Fleeson, 2001). It is thus no surprise that the most thoroughly validated individual-
differences have been extensively connected to behavior. Individual-differences that lack behavioral referents 
have questionable validity, such as self-report scales of altruism that fail to predict helping (Batson, Bolen, 
Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986). 
 
Construct validity is particularly pressing for the rumination–reflection model because it posits two 
components: self-focused attention and a self-relevant motive. As a result, rumination and reflection could 
predict other variables when one component has no effect. For example, reflection could still predict 
perspective-taking (Joireman et al., 2002), even if it failed to predict self-focus, if reflection’s motivational 
component can drive the relationship. Significant correlations between the rumination–reflection scales and 
other variables do not indicate which component—self-focus or motivation—is responsible for the significant 
difference. Self-relevant motives might account for the effects; self-focus might be superfluous. 
 
3. The present studies 
The present studies directly tested the construct validity of rumination and reflection. If rumination and 
reflection are types of self-focus, then they should predict independent measures of self-focused attention. We 
appraised this relationship for two measures of self-focused attention. In Study 1, people completed a measure 
of self-focus based on visual word recognition. People who are self-focused recognize self-relevant words more 
quickly, relative to less self-focused people (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003). In Study 2, people completed a 
pronoun-selection measure of self-focused attention. Self-focused people use relatively more first-person 
pronouns when completing ambiguous sentences (Davis & Brock, 1975; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980). People 
high in rumination and reflection should thus recognize self-relevant words more quickly and select more self-
relevant pronouns. 
 
The potential for true null effects is a problem for tests of construct validity. It is difficult to know whether 
insignificant relationships between self-focus, rumination, and reflection reflect true null effects. To triangulate 
on the meaning of rumination and reflection, we included criterion variables that satisfied two criteria. First, the 
variable must have correlated with self-focused attention in past research. If a variable correlates with self-focus 
but not with rumination or reflection, then the pattern of effects may imply a true null effect. Second, the 
variable must have correlated with rumination and reflection in Trapnell and Campbell’s (1999) research. If 
rumination and reflection replicate past relationships but do not predict self-focus, the lack of a relationship 
could reflect a true null effect. Neither pattern alone conclusively shows if a null effect represents an absence of 
a relationship. The convergence of both patterns, however, places the null effects within a network of 
replications, thus enabling firmer conclusions. 
 
Two variables fit our criteria. The first variable is self-other similarity. Self-focused people feel less similar to 
other people (Srull & Gaelick, 1983). Furthermore, both rumination and reflection predict self-other similarity. 
Trapnell and Campbell (1999, p. 296) report significant negative correlations between perceptions of self-other 
similarity and rumination (r = −.25) and reflection (r = −.18). The second variable is affect. Relations between 
self-focused attention and negative affect are robust (Fejfar & Hoyle, 2000; Mor & Winquist, 2002). 
Rumination predicts negative affect, whereas reflection does not (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). 
 
4. Study 1 
The first study examined whether rumination and reflection predicted self-focused attention, measured by how 
quickly people recognized self-relevant words. The recognition of self-relevant words is a sensitive measure of 
both state and trait variations in self-focus (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003). People high in private self-
consciousness recognized self-relevant words more quickly than did people low in private self-consciousness 
(Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003, Study 1). Furthermore, a manipulation of self-awareness caused people in the high 
self-focus condition to recognize self-relevant words more quickly, relative to people in the low self-focus 
conditions (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003, Study 2). If rumination and reflection tap self-focused attention, then 
they should correlate negatively with word recognition latencies. 
 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants and design 
A total of 101 people—68 women, 33 men—participated voluntarily over the Internet. The average age was 
27.7 years (SD = 9.34). The study was announced through links on a list of Internet studies hosted by the 
American Psychological Society and at a web site of the Universität der Bundeswehr, Hamburg. 
 
4.1.2. Procedure 
After reading an introduction to the study, people were randomly assigned to complete the rumination–
reflection scales before or after the word recognition task. Rumination and reflection were measured with the 
24-item Rumination–Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; see Trapnell & Campbell, 1999, p. 293, for the items). 
The scale contains 12-item scales for rumination and for reflection. The perception of self-other similarity was 
measured with three items: ―I’m similar to people in general‖; ―Overall, I have a lot in common with other 
people‖; and ―In general, I’m very different from other people‖ (reverse-scored). Participants responded using 
seven-point Likert scales that ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Note that past research typically 
measured self-other similarity with single-item scales (e.g., Srull & Gaelick, 1983; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). 
The self-other similarity items always appeared after both the RRQ and the word-recognition measure. 
 
4.1.3. Word recognition measure 
Self-focused attention was measured with a word-recognition task. Semantic categories that are chronically or 
momentarily salient facilitate recognizing words related to the categories (Besner & Smith, 1992; Eichstaedt, 
2002). For instance, people recognize words more quickly when the words follow semantically-related words—
recognition latencies decrease as semantic overlap increases (Stolz & Neely, 1995). Momentary and chronic 
construct accessibility affect word recognition latencies for conventional cognitive variables (e.g., word 
prototypicality and familiarity; Eichstaedt, under review) and for social and personality constructs (e.g., implicit 
motives; Eichstaedt & Scheffer, under review). For example, people recognize self-referent trait adjectives 
faster than non-referent trait adjectives (Perdue & Gurtman, 1988), and happy people recognize happy words 
faster than sad or neutral words (Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997). 
 
Semantic effects on word recognition are strongest when the recognition process is hindered, such as by 
degrading the word (Borowsky & Besner, 1991) or by providing distractors (Eichstaedt, 2002). This impedes 
the word identification process and thus enables stronger top-down influences on recognition latencies (Stolz & 
Neely, 1995). The word recognition task was implemented within a dynamic display of distracting random 
letters (Eichstaedt, under review). People see a box of three rows of flickering random letters, and they expect 
words to appear in the middle row. Their task is to press any key when they see a word. On each trial, a self-
relevant or a neutral word appears for 400 ms and is followed by random letters for 200 ms. This repeats until 
the participants hit a key, which prompts them to type the word they saw. The self-relevant category contained 
five words (me, myself, self, face, and mine); the neutral category contained five self-irrelevant words (up, 
theory, walk, drop, and they). The 10 words had been equated for length and frequency. After 10 practice trials 
with neutral words, people saw the 10 main words presented in a random order. The word recognition measure 
was implemented as a JAVA-applet that presented the target words and measured response latencies 
(Eichstaedt, 2001). 
 
After completing the study, participants were taken to a debriefing page that explained the study in more detail. 
Participants received a code number that they could send to the experimenter for feedback about their word-
recognition performance. 
 
4.2. Results and discussion 
The word-recognition measure of self-focused attention was scored following the procedures of past research 
(Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003). Only words that were recognized correctly were analyzed. Word-specific effects on 
latencies were controlled by z-scoring with respect to the word’s mean. Individual performance level was 
controlled with z-scoring as well (Perdue & Gurtman, 1988). We then computed a single score for each person 
by subtracting the average latency for neutral words from the average latency for self-relevant words. Negative 
values indicate relatively quicker recognition of self-relevant words, and positive values indicate relatively 
quicker recognition of neutral words. The rumination and reflection scales were averaged, after reverse-scoring 
the appropriate items, to form rumination and reflection scores for each participant. Rumination and reflection 
were uncorrelated (r = .047, p < .64), consistent with Trapnell and Campbell’s (1999) findings. 
 
Did rumination and reflection predict self-focused attention? Neither rumination (r = .006, p < .95) nor 
reflection (r = .002, p < .99) predicted word recognition latencies. Past findings, however, were replicated. Both 
rumination (r = −.18, p < .07) and reflection (r = −.23, p < .019) predicted self-other similarity. The direction 
and magnitude of the effects replicate Trapnell and Campbell’s (1999, p. 256), findings. The word recognition 
measure significantly predicted self-other similarity, r = −.26, p < .009, thus replicating past research on self-
focused attention and perceptions of similarity (Srull & Gaelick, 1983). By replicating an established finding, 
this effect indicates that the word recognition measure did not simply fail to correlate with anything due to 
methodological or measurement limitations. 
 
In summary, Study 1 examined the relations between rumination, reflection, and self-focused attention, using a 
relatively direct measure of the activation of self-relevant information (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003). Neither 
rumination nor reflection predicted how quickly people recognized self-relevant words. But the null effects did 
not reflect an overall absence of predicted, significant findings. First, the word recognition measure of self-
focused attention significantly predicted perceptions of self-other similarity, replicating past research (Srull & 
Gaelick, 1983). Furthermore, both rumination and reflection predicted self-other similarity, thus replicating 
Trapnell and Campbell’s (1999) findings. These replications place the null effects in context. Past findings were 
successfully replicated, but the new predictions central to construct validity were not supported. Although null 
effects are inherently ambiguous, the replications imply that the lack of relation between self-focus and the 
rumination and reflection scales could represent a true null relationship. 
 
5. Study 2 
When one study fails to provide evidence for construct validity, it is important to reassess construct validity 
with different procedures and measures. Study 2 extended our first study by using a different measure of self-
focused attention (Wegner & Giuliano, 1980), assessing additional replications of past findings, and collecting 
data in a conventional laboratory context. The Internet methodology used in Study 1 enabled a diverse sample, 
but the issues involved in Internet sampling are complex, given the youth of Internet-based data collection 
(Birnbaum, 2001; Reips, 2002). 
 
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Participants 
A total of 115 students—99 women and 16 men—enrolled in General Psychology at the University of North 
Carolina at Greensboro completed the study as part of a research participation option. Most students (90.4%) 
were in their first year of college; the average age was 18.5 years. 
 
5.1.2. Measures 
Rumination and reflection. Rumination and reflection were measured with Trapnell and Campbell’s (1999) 24-
item RRQ. Perceptions of self-other similarity were measured with the same three-item scale used in Study 1. 
People responded to these items on seven-point Likert scales (endpoints: strongly disagree and strongly agree). 
Affect. Positive and negative affect were measured with the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This 20-item scale yields scores for Positive Affect and Negative Affect. 
People indicated the extent to which they felt each emotional state ―in general, that is, on the average,‖ using 
five-point Likert scales. 
 
Self-focused attention. Each person completed the ―Linguistic Implications Form,‖ a 20-item scale developed 
by Wegner and Giuliano (1980). Each item is an incomplete sentence that is completed with one of three 
pronouns. For each sentence, the choices consist of one self-relevant pronoun (I, me, or my) and two filler 
pronouns (e.g., she, their, our). One item, for example, reads ―Someone stopped (them, me, us) to get directions 
to the stadium.‖ The dependent measure is the percentage of self-relevant pronouns. Many manipulations of 
self-focused attention (mirrors, cameras, self-novelty) increase the selection of self-relevant pronouns (e.g., 
Salovey, 1992; Snow, Duval, & Silvia, in press). This measure has outperformed alternative measures in some 
studies (Silvia & Abele, 2002). 
 
5.2. Results and discussion 
The distribution of self-focus scores deviated from normality (Kolmogorov–Smirnov Z = 1.43, p < .033), 
showing a sharp positive skew. A log-transformation was thus applied to the raw scores. Scoring of rumination 
and reflection was the same as in Study 1. Neither rumination (r = .09, p < .29) nor reflection predicted scores 
on the pronoun-selection measure (r = .14, p < .13). Rumination and reflection were correlated (r = .233, 
p < .012), so we conducted a regression analysis to assess their independent effects on self-focus. When 
considered jointly, neither rumination (β = .07, p < .47) nor reflection (β = .126, p < .19) predicted responses to 
the pronoun task. However, the findings from past research were replicated. Rumination significantly predicted 
negative affect (r = .459, p < .001) and self-other similarity (r = −.271, p < .031). Reflection significantly 
predicted positive affect (r = .211, p < .024) and self-other similarity (r = −.364, p < .001). As in Study 1, the 
triangulation of effects did not find evidence for an attentional component. The expected relations between 
rumination, reflection and self-focus did not appear. These null effects were located in a network of replicated 
effects, indicating that the study did not merely fail to find anything. 
 
6. General discussion 
The original public and private self-consciousness model represented individual-differences with an 
attention × content framework. People were said to vary in the intensity of self-directed attention and in the 
content (public or private) of that attention (Buss, 1980; Fenigstein et al., 1975). Trapnell and Campbell’s 
(1999) motivational interpretation of private self-consciousness proposes an attention × motivation framework. 
Rumination and reflection involve attention—people high on each trait are high in chronic self-focus. The type 
of motivation differs, however, from anxiety and fear in rumination to curiosity and epistemic motives in 
reflection. The task for research on rumination and reflection is to validate each component of the model. 
Rumination and reflection must connect with attention and with motivation. Otherwise, positing an 
attention × motivation model would not be parsimonious—one could attribute the effects to self-focus alone or 
to motives alone. 
 
Do rumination and reflection work because of self-focused attention? In the present studies, rumination and 
reflection did not predict self-focused attention. This null effect appeared in different types of samples (a 
diverse Internet sample and a conventional sample of students) and on different measures of self-focus (a 
latency-based measure and a pencil-and-paper measure). Although null effects are inherently ambiguous, the 
triangulation of effects suggests that rumination and reflection may be unrelated to self-focused attention. The 
present studies replicated past findings for rumination and reflection—as in past research (Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999), these variables predicted affect and perceptions of self-other similarity. 
 
What do the present findings mean for the interpretation of rumination and reflection? Trapnell and Campbell 
(1999) sought to represent the motivational qualities of private self-consciousness in their new scales. In trying 
to refine the motivational variance, their scales may have lost the attentional variance of the original private 
self-consciousness scale. Past research has identified different motivational bases of rumination and reflection. 
Rumination, rooted in neuroticism, and reflection, rooted in openness to experience, seem to have distinct 
motivational qualities. No research thus far, however, demonstrates attentional aspects. The accumulated 
literature on rumination and reflection is thus consistent with a strictly motivational interpretation instead of a 
motivation × attention interpretation. Rumination and reflection may be types of self-relevant motivation, but 
they do not seem to be types of self-focused attention. 
 
Recent research by Teasdale and Green (2004) supports the notion that rumination and reflection more closely 
measure motivation than attention. In their experiment, people rated the ―at-oneness‖ of accessible 
autobiographical memories. Rumination predicted a lack of at-oneness, whereas reflection did not predict at-
oneness. However, rumination’s relation to autobiographical memory was entirely explained by its relation to 
neuroticism. When rumination and neuroticism were considered jointly, only neuroticism significantly 
predicted at-oneness of memories. This finding indicates a strong connection between rumination and its 
motivational substrate of neuroticism, and it also raises concerns regarding the incremental validity of 
rumination. 
 
The model of rumination and reflection is part of a broader renewal of interest in individual-differences in self-
awareness. One new model distinguishes between self-reflection and insight (Grant et al., 2002). Self-reflection 
is ―the inspection and evaluation of one’s thoughts, feelings and behavior,‖ whereas insight is ―the clarity of 
understanding of one’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior‖ (Grant et al., 2002, p. 821). The self-absorption model 
measures inflexible, excessive attention to public and private aspects of the self (McKenzie & Hoyle, 1999). 
Some researchers propose facets for the original public and private self-consciousness scales (Nystedt & 
Ljungberg, 2002). The second generation of models would benefit from close attention to construct validity. 
These new models assume that the individual-differences are founded on self-focused attention. Correlating the 
new scales with established measures is informative, but the incisive test is whether the scales predict self-
focused attention. Many ways of measuring self-focused attention have been developed, including paper-and-
pencil scales (Davis & Brock, 1975; Govern & Marsch, 2001; Sedikides, 1992; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980), 
response-time measures (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003; Geller & Shaver, 1976), and thought-listing (Greenberg & 
Pyszczynski, 1986). Research should take advantage of these tools. 
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